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During the past two or three decades structural change in the Australian financial
system has been rapid. The system has grown substantially in assets and volumes of
activity, has become much more open and competitive, and has undergone some
significant shifts in market shares. There has also been much innovation in financial
products and delivery systems. In  analysing these historical trends a useful
distinction can be made between two major parts of the financial system: the
financial intermediaries (or credit institutions), of which banks form the largest part;
and the funds managers, typified by superannuation funds and unit trusts. Although
the overlaps between these two institutional groupings are increasing, their historical
trends have been driven by rather different forces.
Within the intermediaries sector two broad processes of change have been evident.
The first involved the interaction between regulatory policy and financial innovation.
Prior to the main thrust of financial deregulation in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
banks lost market share to less heavily regulated institutions, a trend that eventually
gave impetus to the move to deregulate. In the post-deregulation period, these trends
in market share were reversed and, in the process, the system was opened to greater
competition.
The second main historical process has been a shift in the economics of production
of banks’ traditional financial services – what is often referred to as a process of
‘unbundling’. This entails a move toward production and pricing of key products on
a stand-alone basis, stimulated by the development of specialist suppliers such as
mortgage managers or cash management trusts. Competition from these sources has
put pressure on the traditional full-service suppliers (the banks) to cut margins and
to reduce cross-subsidies.
In the funds-management sector, and particularly the  superannuation funds, the
driving forces have been somewhat different. Policy changes in the areas of taxation
and compulsory contributions have had an important impact on the structure of the
industry. However, the most important factor behind the rapid growth of the
industry since the early 1980s has been the high average rate of return accumulated
on fund investments over that period. The available data do not yet show the
increases in net new contributions to the funds expected to result from increases in
compulsory contributions.2
Notwithstanding the historical differences between the two sectors, there have been
increasing areas of overlap between them. For example, banks have become more
active in funds-management business through subsidiaries, and funds-management
institutions have become more active in areas of traditional bank business such as
mortgage lending. These developments pose a challenge for regulators as to where
are the appropriate regulatory boundaries between the different groups of
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1. Introduction
Like other industrial countries, Australia has experienced major changes to its
financial system in recent decades. The net effect has been a transformation in the
Australian financial system from a relatively closed, oligopolistic structure in the
1950s and 1960s, based predominantly on traditional bank intermediation, to a more
open and competitive system offering a much wider variety of services from an
array of different providers. This process of financial system evolution, while driven
largely by market forces, has been assisted by prevailing regulatory and supervisory
arrangements.
A process comparable to that seen in Australia has been observed and widely
discussed in the United States under the generic heading ‘the decline in traditional
banking’.1 There, the phrase has been used to describe a long-term trend involving
financial disintermediation and a resulting fall in the relative size of the banking
sector compared to other forms of financing. It has been associated, in particular,
with an increasing trend towards financing through securities markets. The debate in
Australia has been somewhat different, though it shares some common elements
with the overseas experience. Here, the focus has been not on a decline in banks per
se since, by most quantitative standards, Australian banks currently dominate the
financial system as much as at any time in the past few decades. Rather, against a
background of change, the focus is on how the competitive forces already at work
might affect the future structure of the system, including the nature of the core
business of banking and the boundaries between banks and other providers of
financial services.
Among the range of influences on financial-sector development, three main forces
can be highlighted. The first has been the role of financial regulatory policy which,
                                                                                                                                  
1  See  Edwards (1993) and  Ettin (1995). An alternative view is given by Boyd and
Gertler (1994).2
to an important degree, shaped the broad trends in banks’ market shares in recent
decades – the extended period of decline up until the early 1980s and subsequent
recovery in the post-deregulation period. Second, technological developments have
been important in reducing the cost of many information-intensive financial
activities and in making available a wide range of new products and delivery
systems. A third influence arises from the interaction of these first two factors with
the historical cost and pricing structure of traditional  intermediation, and in
particular with the traditional cross-subsidisation of payments services by banks.
The persistence of elements of this pricing structure has created opportunities for
growth of specialist low-cost financial service providers which have become an
increasingly important source of competitive pressure on banks. An analysis of how
these forces have shaped the evolution of the system underlies much of the
discussion that follows.
In Section 2 of the paper we give a general overview of the main trends in the
financial sector and try to relate those trends to the changing demands of the users
of financial services: the government, household and business sectors. Section 3
deals in more detail with banks and financial intermediaries while Section 4 looks at
the life insurance and  superannuation sector, with an overall assessment drawn
together in Section 5. There is an attempt in that final section to raise some
questions about the boundaries between the traditionally defined institutions which
form the basis of existing supervisory and regulatory arrangements.
2. Overview of the Main Trends
2.1 The Starting Point: The Financial System in the 1950s and 1960s
While the 1950s might seem a remote starting point for analysis, the period provides
a good stylised model of what might be called the ‘traditional’ financial system, and
many of the important trends to be analysed can be traced back to that time. In the
discussion that follows we make use of a basic distinction between the financial
intermediaries sector, comprising those institutions whose core functions involve
borrowing and lending,2 and the  managed-funds sector, comprising mainly life
                                                                                                                                  
2  The main groups are banks, merchant banks, finance companies, building societies, credit
unions and pastoral financiers.3
insurance and superannuation funds along with other investment vehicles like unit
trusts. It will be argued that this represents a reasonably natural distinction and that
competition within each of the two sectors has generally been more important than
competition across sectors. Emerging areas of competition and functional overlap
between the two areas are discussed in Section 4.
Table 1 illustrates long-run trends in the structure of the financial intermediaries
sector. It can be seen that, until the 1950s, financial  intermediation was largely
synonymous with banking. In 1953, banks accounted for 88 per cent of the total
assets of this sector while the next largest group, pastoral financiers, had only 4 per
cent. A summary balance sheet for banks at around the same period (Table 2) shows
the main elements of what might be regarded as the traditional bank product mix.
Deposits were raised mainly from low-cost sources, with non-interest-bearing
cheque accounts and low-interest savings bank deposits together funding around 85
per cent of the balance sheet. Fixed deposits represented most of the remainder. On
the asset side, almost half the balance sheet was invested in government securities
or held in SRDs, and around 40 per cent accounted for by loans. With interest rate
controls in place, bank loans were rationed and available only to the most
creditworthy of borrowers. Banks faced little competitive pressure from other
institutions, which had not yet begun their rapid development, and the system was
not open to foreign bank entry or to offshore transactions. Banking business was
essentially a low-risk proposition conducted at regulated prices.
The other main part of the system was the managed-funds sector, which in terms of
assets was around one-third the size of the banks. This comprised principally life
offices and superannuation funds, which offered very different services from banks
in the form of long-term, highly tax-favoured saving plans. There was some overlap
with banking functions in the provision of mortgage lending by life offices, which
helped to satisfy the demand for mortgages unmet by banks. This4
Table 1: Assets of Financial Intermediaries
Per cent of total
1929 1936 1953 1970 1980 1985 1990 1995
Banks 94 95 88 70 58 59 69 77
Building societies 2 2 3 5 12 10 5 2
Credit unions — — — 1 1 2 2 2
Money market corporations — — — 3 6 11 11 9
Pastoral financiers 4 3 4 3 1 2 0 0
Finance companies — 1 3 15 18 13 9 6
Other — — 1 3 4 3 4 3
Sources: Martin Committee (1991) and Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin.
Table 2: Balance Sheet of the Banking Sector
$ million, June 1956





2,336 — 2,336 43.0
Savings bank deposits — 2,289 2,289 42.1
Fixed deposits 514 — 514 9.5
Other (excludes capital) 142 — 142 2.6
Assets
SRDs 521 n.a. 521 9.6
Government securities 415 1,704 2,119 39.0
Loans 1,945 364 2,309 42.5
Other 366 119 485 8.9
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia Occasional Paper No. 8.
area of lending activity was quite substantial in the 1950s and 1960s but
subsequently declined, for reasons discussed in Section 4.3
                                                                                                                                  
3  More recently, life offices have again become active in the mortgage market.5
From this sketch we can summarise the three elements of what might be called the
traditional bank business mix; namely, lending, deposit-taking and the provision of
transactions services.4 An important question that recurs through this paper is the
extent to which these three services need to be provided in a single institution. In
this respect a central part of the developing story concerns the emergence of new
financial products and new institutions that can compete separately for profitable
lines of business, without taking on the whole of the banking product mix. This sort
of competition was not possible in the 1950s and 1960s when securities markets
were undeveloped and separation of deposit and lending functions, as is now
exemplified by cash management trusts and mortgage managers, was not possible.
2.2 Development of Financial Institutions
Overall growth of the financial system and its institutional subsectors is illustrated in
Figure 1. System assets more than doubled as a ratio to GDP between the 1960s and
1990s, with much of that growth occurring in the immediate post-deregulation
period in the second half of the 1980s. This has been followed by a period of slower
growth but the long-term trend still appears to be upward, consistent with patterns in
other countries and with theoretical notions of ‘financial deepening’ as an economy
grows. That is, the demand for financial services, broadly defined, tends to increase
faster than the increase in income.
Banks went through an extended period of declining market share during the 1960s
and 1970s, when corresponding gains were made by non-bank financial
intermediaries, particularly building societies, finance companies, merchant banks
and, later, unit trusts (trends that will be elaborated further below). This trend
reflected the competitive disadvantage that financial regulations placed on banks. In
particular, interest rate controls tended to keep the entire structure of bank rates
below market-clearing levels, with a consequent rationing of bank funds and the
emergence of a ready market for funding at higher rates. To some
                                                                                                                                  
4  A fourth element, the passive holding of government securities, is best thought of as something
separate and only incidentally important in the early post-war period, rather than being part of
the core business of banking; it was a product of regulation and of the high levels of
government debt incurred during the war.6
Figure 1:  Total Assets of Financial Institutions
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extent, the banks became involved in this market by creating new non-bank
subsidiaries to conduct this business ‘outside’ the bank itself and, therefore, outside
regulatory constraints. But there was also a substantial growth of non-bank financial
institutions (NBFIs) not affiliated to the domestic banking sector. In a number of
cases, these institutions were owned by foreign banks that sought a financial
presence in Australia but were precluded from establishing a formal banking
operation by the effective moratorium on new foreign banking authorities before
1985. In other cases, non-bank institutions were joint ventures between domestic
and foreign banks.
A strong reverse trend in these market shares has been observed in the
post-deregulation period as the banks’ ability to compete with NBFIs improved. In
addition, banks reabsorbed non-bank affiliates onto their balance sheets and there
were a number of prominent non-bank institutions, particularly building societies,
which found it advantageous to convert to banks in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
A one-off easing of restrictions on foreign bank entry in the mid 1980s, and the7
more open entry policy adopted in the early 1990s, saw the foreign bank presence
increase, in part at the expense of the merchant bank sector.
A critical factor shaping the recent history of the financial system, and widely
analysed elsewhere, was the credit boom which followed financial deregulation.
This phenomenon, and its interaction with  macroeconomic developments in the
1980s, contributed to growth of the financial sector in a number of ways. Most
importantly, it gave the system the capacity to satisfy long-standing, repressed
demands for finance. This had the predictable (in a qualitative sense) effect of
allowing a one-off expansion of the financial sector relative to its historical trend.
Related to this, the expansion in the availability of finance contributed to an asset
price boom which further fed back into credit growth. Rising asset prices and
expectations of continued asset price inflation fed the demand for credit and also
provided increased collateral to support debt-financed asset acquisition. Finally,
rising real asset prices and the high real interest rates that followed deregulation
meant that the managed-funds sector generated exceptionally high rates of return in
the 1980s. Since these funds tended to be locked in (particularly in superannuation
funds) and automatically reinvested, the high rates of return contributed
substantially to growth in these institutions’ assets. The net result was a near
doubling of the size of the financial sector relative to GDP in little more than a
decade.
The shifting market share of banks  vis-à-vis other financial intermediaries is
illustrated more starkly in Figure 2, which shows banks’ assets as a share of the
total financial  intermediation sector. This declined steeply to a low point of
57 per cent in 1982 before recovering equally dramatically to almost 80 per cent by
1994, comparable to banks’ market share in the 1960s. The pattern of decline and
recovery is exaggerated somewhat by the growth and subsequent reabsorption of
NBFI subsidiaries by banks, but the qualitative picture remains valid; on a
consolidated basis, banks’ asset share fell to a trough of 61 per cent in 1981, still a
substantial reduction in the market share of consolidated banking groups from the
levels of the 1960s and 1970s. On the other hand, the recovery in banks’ aggregate
market share during the subsequent period was substantially boosted by the entry of
new banks, particularly through the conversion of existing non-bank intermediaries.
When new and pre-existing banks are shown separately, it is apparent that banks
already existing in the mid 1980s largely did not recover the market share lost in8
earlier decades. This may be one indicator of the increasingly competitive
environment faced by banks, a theme that will be discussed in greater detail below.
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2.3 The Non-Financial Sectors
Before turning to a more detailed analysis of competitive forces within the
intermediation sector it will be useful to look at trends in the financial demands of
the other parts of the economy which are the financial sector’s clients. This is done
in the next three subsections covering the government, corporate and household
sectors.
2.3.1 Government
Developments in government finance have exerted a powerful influence on the
financial sector throughout the postwar period. The federal government entered the
postwar period with a substantial volume of debt, amounting in 1950 to more than
100 per cent of GDP. This ratio was steadily reduced until the late 1970s and
underwent a further major reduction in the second half of the 1980s, reaching a9
trough of 15 per cent of GDP in 1990/91. This trend has meant that holdings of
government debt have necessarily represented a diminishing proportion of the
balance sheets of financial institutions, and particularly of banks, which had held a
large part of the outstanding supply in the 1950s. The reduction in government
security holdings in turn allowed banks to expand their lending to the household and
corporate sectors, thereby gradually changing the structure of banks’ balance sheets.
Between the early 1950s and the early 1990s, public sector securities and SRDs fell
from over 50 per cent to under 10 per cent of banks’ total assets.
The combination of higher deficits and higher inflation in the 1970s had important
consequences for the financial system in general and for the marketing of
government securities in particular. High and variable inflation meant that the
demand for government securities became more unpredictable at the same time as
the flow of deficits to be financed increased. This in turn generated difficulties of
monetary control that led to pressure for the introduction of market-based
mechanisms to ensure that government financing requirements could be met.
Important responses to these pressures were the introduction of treasury note
tenders in 1979 and bond tenders in 1982, replacing the previous systems of
administered interest rates on these instruments. The move to market-determined
rates on these securities in turn stimulated a whole range of other financial
developments as well as intensifying the pressure to deregulate deposit and lending
rates of banks, a process described in detail by Grenville (1991).
2.3.2 Corporate sector
By international standards, leverage within the Australian corporate sector has
traditionally been relatively low, and this remains the case despite a substantial
increase in corporate borrowing in the late 1980s. Average debt-equity ratios of
Australian companies appear broadly similar to those in the United States and
Canada but significantly below those in the United Kingdom, other European
countries and Japan (Table 3).5 As is elaborated by Prowse (1996), differences in
leverage and other aspects of the corporate funding mix reflect a wide range of
differences in the structural characteristics of the respective economies. One
important dimension of this is the distinction often drawn between ‘Anglo-Saxon’
                                                                                                                                  
5  Some caution is needed in comparing balance sheet ratios across countries because of
differences in accounting practices.10
and ‘universal-banking’ financial systems, which differ in the extent to which their
institutional characteristics  favour  intermediated rather than direct financing of
business activities. Prowse argues that there is some tendency for these divergent
systems to become more similar, a result of ongoing financial innovation and
internationalisation of financial systems.
Table 3: Debt-Equity Ratios of Non-Financial Enterprises
1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1993
United States 0.5 0.8 1.0
Japan 4.8 4.2 4.0
Germany 3.6 2.7 2.8
France 2.7 2.2 1.4
Italy 3.6 3.0 3.1
United Kingdom 1.1 1.1 —
Canada 0.9 0.9 1.0
Australia 0.5 0.6 0.6
Sources: OECD Non-financial Enterprises Financial Statements (for all countries except Germany and Australia);
OECD Financial Statistics (for Germany); and Reserve Bank of Australia.
The Australian historical experience seems broadly consistent with the pattern of
increasing corporate debt observed in other low-leverage systems, particularly in the
United States and Canada. Starting from a low base in the 1950s and 1960s, the
average debt-equity ratio in Australia has been on a sustained upward trend,
accelerating sharply in the second half of the 1980s before the subsequent period of
debt reduction observed more recently (Figure 3). The spike in leverage in the late
1980s is in fact understated by the data in Figure 3, based on a continuous sample of
companies, since many of the companies whose leverage increased most
dramatically at that time did not survive the period and are therefore excluded from
the continuous sample.6 Notwithstanding the substantial debt reductions that took
place in the early 1990s, the volume of corporate debt outstanding remains
considerably higher relative to GDP than was the case in the early 1980s, and the
most recent data suggest that corporate borrowing has again begun to increase.
                                                                                                                                  
6  See Mills, Morling and Tease (1993).11
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An important characteristic of the debt component of Australian corporate financing
is the limited use made of direct borrowing through the issue of corporate securities.
Corporate borrowing demands in Australia have traditionally been met mainly by
financial intermediaries – that is, by banks, merchant banks and finance companies,
with the largest part of the market being accounted for by banks. Currently only
around 10 per cent of the aggregate corporate balance sheet is financed by debt
securities.7 In this respect the pattern of corporate financing in Australia differs from
those in the larger English-speaking countries, particularly the United States and the
United Kingdom, where debt security issuance has historically represented a
sizeable proportion of overall corporate sector funding.8 A possible explanation is
the smaller size of the Australian economy and the relatively small number of
Australian companies that would be considered large on an international scale.
Direct security issuance is clearly likely to be more viable the larger the company
                                                                                                                                  
7  This figure excludes bank bill finance.
8  Data presented by Tease and Wilkinson (1993) suggest that, in flow terms, security issuance
provided funding of comparable magnitude to bank loans for the corporate sectors of both
countries in the 1980s.12
(other things equal), since large companies are more likely to have well-established
reputations as well as being able to spread the cost of information over a larger
volume of capital to be raised.
The fact that direct forms of financing have not been favoured to date, however,
provides little guide to the future. There is a strong belief within banking circles that
a number of underlying factors are generating conditions which could lead to an
expansion in the corporate debt market. One factor is the increased sophistication of
institutional investors and increased demand from that source for good quality debt.
In Australia, the expected expansion in the funds-management and superannuation
sector could be an important catalyst in this regard. The potential for growth could
be further enhanced if attempts to rein in the growth of government debt are
successful in the years ahead, as there could then be an increase in demand for
alternative securities.
These observations concerning direct and indirect funding have an important bearing
on the larger question of the long-term role of banks. An important part of the core
business of banks, and of financial intermediaries more generally, has been the
funding of businesses through non-marketable loans. Intermediaries earn income in
this line of business through the application of expertise in credit assessment and
from their store of detailed knowledge about individual borrowers. The question
arises as to whether this line of business, or some segment of this business, will
continue to represent a growth market for financial intermediaries, as it has over
much of the historical period reviewed above.
One view, put for example by Bisignano (1991), is that technological improvement
is continually reducing the information costs associated with direct financing, even
for relatively small companies. Goodhart (1988) takes a somewhat contrary view
arguing that banks (or financial intermediaries more broadly defined) seem likely to
retain at least that part of lending linked to the small to medium business sector,
where the practical difficulties of assessing creditworthiness are much greater,
technological improvements notwithstanding, than for larger companies. It could, of
course, be argued that the issue is more involved than suggested by either of the
above authors. Corporate demands for finance tend to be diverse, with required
borrowings linked variously to long-term capital investments at one extreme or to
the need for shorter-term standby and liquidity facilities on a day-to-day basis.
While direct forms of financing could be an efficient means of obtaining longer-term13
funds, a role could still exist for  intermediated forms of financing in satisfying
shorter-term requirements, even where the largest borrowers are concerned. It could
also be argued that, even if there is a significant shift towards direct forms of
financing, banks would be well placed to provide the associated services of
origination, underwriting and distribution.
2.3.3 Households
The data in Figure 4 illustrate the household sector’s position as a net holder of
financial assets and show that both sides of the aggregate household balance sheet
have undergone a trend expansion over several decades. Notwithstanding this trend,
and the fluctuations in some of the balance-sheet components, an immediately
striking feature of the asset side of the balance sheet is the relative stability of
household deposit holdings. These currently stand at just under 40 per cent of GDP
and have shown only minor fluctuations around a very gradually rising trend since
the early 1960s. There seems to be reasonably close substitutability among deposits
of competing intermediaries, suggested by the fact that the trend in total deposits is
much more stable than either the bank or non-bank components of that aggregate.
This could be argued to be consistent with a fairly stable level of desired deposit
holdings relative to income, driven essentially by transaction and short-term saving
requirements, with the institutional split between banks and non-banks being
influenced by the relative attractiveness of their interest rates.9 This behaviour can
be contrasted with the much greater variation in household assets held with life
insurance and  superannuation funds, which did not appear to give rise to any
offsetting fluctuations in deposit holdings. In other words, household  behaviour
seems to make a clear distinction between deposits with intermediaries and balances
with funds managers.10
On the other side of the balance sheet the most important item is lending for
housing, which accounts for around three-quarters of personal sector borrowing.
Growth in overall borrowing by the household sector shows no sign of abating and,
as in other areas of financial intermediation, banks have gained a strong recovery in
                                                                                                                                  
9  This view is consistent with more detailed evidence presented by Dilnot (1990).
10 A separate question concerns the substitutability between  superannuation and other non-
deposit stores of household saving, which is not addressed here. See Morling and Subbaraman
(1995).14
market share since the mid 1980s, although very recent developments are putting
that share under pressure.
Figure 4:  Household Sector
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3. Financial Intermediation and Securities Markets
Within the intermediaries sector, two main trends have been important in shaping
the competitive environment. The first, already outlined in Section 2, was the
development of financial regulatory policy and its interaction with performance of
the different groups of intermediaries. In broad outline, banks lost market share up
to the mid 1980s but regained it rapidly once deregulation allowed them to compete
for business on more equal terms. As is evident referring back to Table 1, banks15
now dominate the intermediation sector to an extent not seen since the 1950s and
1960s, accounting for almost 80 per cent of the total assets of this group of
institutions. But it is worth underlining the ease with which business could move
back and forth between banks and non-bank intermediaries as competitive
advantages shifted.
The second trend, to be elaborated further below, has been the unbundling of the
banks’ traditional product mix. This refers to the increasing capacity for new
entrants to bid separately for components of banks’ traditional business without
offering a comprehensive range of banking services. This trend has potentially far-
reaching consequences for the financial sector since it suggests that, even in an
environment where banks are not hampered by regulatory constraints, there may be
increasing competitive pressure on the most profitable parts of banks’ traditional
business base.
3.1 The Bank Product Mix
As was argued earlier, the traditional mix of products provided by banks can be
viewed in broad terms as comprising three elements – deposit-taking, lending and
providing transactions services. This of course has never been the complete picture
and in recent years bank activities have expanded well beyond the traditional
product range, as evidenced by the growing proportion of banks’ income arising
from fee-related activities as opposed to net interest earnings. Nonetheless, net
interest income continues to provide the bulk of the aggregate profits of Australian
banks, indicative of the fact that traditional intermediation services remain a central
part of their overall business.11
An important issue to be addressed in relation to the basic economics of the banks’
product mix concerns the extent to which the joint products within the mix are
inherently separable. In other words, to what extent can the markets for these
services be competed for separately rather than delivered jointly by ‘full-service’
institutions? Historical trends suggest that there has always been at least some scope
for specialist institutions to compete with banks on a partial range of services.
                                                                                                                                  
11 Currently around 60 per cent of banks’ income is accounted for by net interest. This figure
understates the importance of intermediation business since it excludes bill acceptance fees,
which are really a form of intermediation income.16
Important examples in the 1960s and 1970s were the building societies and finance
companies, which could be thought of as offering limited ranges of deposit and
lending services independent from the more comprehensive services, including
transaction facilities, available from banks. These institutions grew rapidly in those
decades (Figure 5), although the growth was much more a result of their ability to
operate outside of key regulatory controls than to the specialist characteristics of
their product lines.
A much more important spur to competition for specialist lines of business came
with the growth in size and liquidity of securities markets in the late 1970s and early
1980s. This allowed specialist institutions either to finance their lending activities by
raising funds in liquid securities markets, or to operate effectively as retail deposit-
takers while investing their funds in securities rather than loans. In other words, the
development of securities markets helped to make possible the provision of deposit
and lending services by separate institutions.
Three examples can be cited as illustrative of the process.
First, on the deposit side, was the growth of cash management trusts, the first of
which was established in 1981. Although these are, strictly speaking,
funds-management rather than deposit-taking institutions, they offer a service that
from the point of view of the customer is akin to a short-term retail deposit offering
close to wholesale rates of interest. Cash management trusts remain relatively small
in aggregate (currently with around $7 billion in total assets, or around 3 per cent of
aggregate household deposits) but have had an important impact on competition for
the marginal depositor, and hence on the pricing of banks’ own deposit services. In
this way they have contributed to the competitive pressures that have seen a steady
erosion of banks’ low-cost deposit base.
A second example, on the lending side, was the growth of merchant banking. This
occurred in two distinct phases – one in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the
other in the 1980s (see Figure 5). Asset price inflation and an expanding17
Figure 5:  NBFI Assets


























Source: Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin.
demand for credit played a role in both episodes, with these institutions being active
lenders at the more speculative end of the risk spectrum. Regulatory constraints on
banks also clearly played a big role in the earlier episode but it is significant that
merchant banking activity continued to expand rapidly in the mid 1980s after those
constraints on banks were removed. The merchant banking sector engages in a wide
range of financial activities but an essential characteristic of much of their activity is
to provide loans to businesses, funded by borrowing in domestic financial markets
or from non-residents. In this way, they perform the lending and credit assessment
functions associated with traditional banking without engaging in retail
deposit-taking. Merchant bank assets expanded to a peak of around 13 per cent of
the financial intermediaries sector in 1988 but then contracted sharply for several
years. They nonetheless remain a significant presence as the largest of the non-bank18
intermediary categories, currently accounting for just under 10 per cent of total
intermediaries’ assets.
The third and more recent example of specialist competition is the growth of
mortgage managers. These have been in existence since at least the 1970s but it is
only in the past few years that they have grown dramatically and emerged as a
significant, though still small, competitor to banks in the housing loan market. They
currently account for about 8 per cent of new housing loans, compared with a
market share of less than 1 per cent only a few years ago (Figure 6). Mortgage
managers arrange housing loans largely funded by the issue of mortgage-backed
securities that are in turn mainly held by institutional investors. The growth of this
market provides a good illustration of the potential for separation of lending from
deposit-taking functions in the financial intermediation sector, and also illustrates
the role that funds managers can play as providers of funds to specialist institutions.
Figure 6:  Mortgage Managers’ Housing Lending
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Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics Cat. Nos 5609.0 and 5643.0 and Department of Industry, Science and
Tourism.19
The market opportunity for mortgage managers arose from a number of factors,
discussed in more detail below, that contributed to a widening of the gap between
standard housing loan rates and money-market interest rates; this was particularly
evident in 1992 and 1993 when the gap was around 4 percentage points, though it
has since narrowed considerably (Figure 7). By comparison, rough estimates
suggest that mortgage managers can deliver a residential mortgage product at the
bank bill rate plus around 150 to 200 basis points. The widening of the banks’
interest differential in this area could be argued to have been partly a cyclical
phenomenon; banks typically smooth out the path of mortgage interest rates relative
to money-market rates and this means that the difference between the two is likely
to be largest at the bottom of the interest rate cycle. But there is also an important
structural dimension to this issue (discussed in detail below). Increasing competition
for deposits, and a desire to preserve average profit margins, have meant that the
overall structure of bank interest rates on both the deposit and lending sides have
moved up relative to money-market interest rates. This created the opportunity for
specialist lenders, funding themselves at money-market related rates, to undercut the
banks and put pressure on banks to lower margins.
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Source: Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin.20
It should be noted that the process of disentangling traditional banking products by
specialist institutions or entities is still in its infancy in Australia. In the
United States, where disintermediation has been a feature of the financial system for
a decade or more, almost two-thirds of residential mortgages and half of the
outstanding credit card receivables are now funded through the wholesale markets
via securitisation programs. Other entities, such as state and local authorities, are
increasingly looking beyond the banking system to fund their activities via the issue
of securities backed by their receivables (water, electricity, gas etc). These practices
have the potential to erode further the traditional market for bank funding in the
United States and there is no reason to believe, in principle, that a similar process
could not take hold in Australia. The issue, essentially, is the efficiencies which can
be derived out of the intermediary structure as opposed to the efficiencies of
separately producing each of the services implicit in the intermediation process.
3.2 Competition and Margins
An important influence on these competitive developments has been the traditional
pricing structure of the banks’ joint product mix. This has typically involved very
low fees for transactions services, with bank revenue essentially coming from the
net interest margin, a system often described as one involving ‘implicit’ interest
payments to deposit holders in the form of free or low-cost transactions services.
This pricing structure was sustainable as long as there were reasonably strong
natural barriers to the separate production of banks’ core services, which was
essentially the case up to the 1970s. As noted above, the absence of well-developed
securities markets meant that lending and deposit services could not be separately
provided, and there was little scope to provide transactions services independently
of deposit-taking facilities. The key subsequent development is that, to an increasing
degree, separate production of these services is now possible and, as illustrated
earlier, the new ‘production technology’ for basic deposit and lending services is
increasingly one which does not require extensive branch networks. To the extent
that this is the case (and the trend is still at an early stage) it means that the
economic function of branch infrastructure should be viewed as being related
primarily to transactions rather than intermediation services. This in turn suggests
that, under the prevailing price structure, the provision of transactions services by
banks is essentially loss-making and has to be cross-subsidised from net interest
earnings.21
The pricing structure described above is clearly not one the banks would ideally
want. There is a strong economic logic to pricing transaction services more in line
with costs, and indeed a wide range of transactions fees have been introduced by
banks in recent years. These appear however, to remain well short of full cost
recovery.12 The low-price regime on transactions services is essentially inherited
from history and banks have faced strong public resistance to changing it.
Nonetheless, the situation seems unlikely to be sustainable indefinitely, and changes
are occurring. Banks will be unable to compete with specialist institutions while
they are required to cross-subsidise payments services which their competitors do
not offer.
The need to cross-subsidise transactions services and maintain an expensive
infrastructure network have important implications for banks’ competitive position,
particularly when viewed in conjunction with another development, the decline in
banks’ low-cost deposit base (Figure 8). Low-cost deposits – defined here as non-
interest-bearing accounts, statement savings accounts and passbook accounts –
currently represent about 12 per cent of the major banks’ total liabilities. This is
down from over 50 per cent in 1980 and from even higher levels in the 1960s and
1970s. The trend can be attributed to a number of longer-term factors including the
effect of periods of high inflation in sensitising depositors to differences in rates of
return, as well as competition from non-bank competitors. This shift in the
composition of deposits has been an important source of upward pressure on banks’
average cost of funds relative to money-market interest rates.
Another factor influencing this relative cost of funds in the past few years has been
the decline in inflation and the consequent fall in average nominal interest rates.
Since the ‘low’ interest rates referred to above had little or no scope to fall further,
the general fall in market interest rates has necessarily compressed the margin
between low-cost and market rates. In other words, the cost advantage derived from
a given volume of low-cost deposits has declined at the same time as their share of
total deposits has fallen. In a low-inflation environment, there is no reason to expect
a significant reversal of this trend.
                                                                                                                                  
12 The Prices Surveillance Authority (1995) concludes that bank transaction services are priced
significantly below cost on the basis of allocations of infrastructure costs in line with standard
accounting principles. See also Burrows and Davis (1995) for a discussion of the economics of
cost allocation for joint products.22
Figure 8:  Low-Cost Deposits of Banks
Per cent of total liabilities



















Source: Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin.
Against this background it is useful to look at what has happened to margins
between deposit and lending rates. The Campbell Committee expected that
deregulation would lead to reduced margins by increasing overall competition and
removing constraints that had channelled competition into non-price areas such as
the extension of branch networks (Valentine 1991). There has been considerable
debate as to whether these and other expected benefits of financial deregulation
have been  realised, and some borrower groups such as small businesses have
expressed concerns recently about high margins.13 These concerns partly reflected
the fact that key lending rates fell less than one-for-one with cash rates during the
extended period of cash-rate reductions in the early 1990s, which was in turn related
to banks’ tendency to smooth their main lending rates over the course of a cycle.
There was also concern that heavy loan-losses incurred by banks made them
reluctant to cut gross margins.
                                                                                                                                  
13 For a discussion of these issues in an Australian context, see Fraser (1994) and the papers in
Macfarlane (ed.) (1991). See also Edey and Hviding (1995) for a discussion of other OECD
countries’ experiences.23
The data presented in Figure 9 summarise a number of aspects of these issues. They
suggest that average margins have been fairly stable although showing some
tendency to fall since the early 1980s. Two features of the data seem particularly
striking. The first is the way that average deposit rates and average lending rates
have moved together over the course of a number of interest rate cycles. These
averages seem much more closely related to each other than to developments in
general securities-market interest rates such as the 90-day bill
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Source: Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin.
rate. Secondly, abstracting from cyclical movements, both deposit and lending rates
have moved upward relative to the bill rate over a period of time. This is true both
for the averages depicted in the upper panel of Figure 9 and for the main indicator24
lending rates. Similar behaviour has been observed in a number of other OECD
countries that deregulated their financial systems.14
In the light of the preceding discussion this  behaviour can be interpreted as
consistent with a form of joint-product pricing that aims to preserve average
margins. With competition having been stronger on the deposit than on the lending
side, average deposit costs have moved upward, and the cost of cross-subsidising
transactions services has effectively been shifted from depositors to borrowers. It is
this pricing structure that is now under pressure from specialist lenders.
The banks have been responding to these pressures on a number of fronts. In the
housing loan market, banks have substantially narrowed the gap between their
standard mortgage rates and the bill rate in the past two years, first by raising
mortgage rates less quickly than the bill rate during 1994, and more recently by
interest rate reductions that were a direct response to the competitive pressures
outlined above. They also introduced reduced-rate loans like ‘honeymoon’ loans
and ‘no-frills’ loans. More generally, the retail banks seem to be adopting marketing
strategies that emphasise the full-service nature of their products, aiming thereby to
differentiate themselves from more specialist institutions. In this regard the ability to
smooth interest rates gives standard bank loans a potentially attractive characteristic
compared with the new securitised loans.
Banks have also sought to reduce costs through measures to increase operating
efficiency, particularly through reductions in branch and staff numbers. Increased
account fees can also be thought of primarily as a cost-containment measure, since
these fees are still pitched well below cost and appear to be designed mainly to
discourage excessive use of transactions facilities. Particularly important has been
the structuring of fees to encourage a shift to electronic payment methods. There has
been considerable expansion of the ATM network and the number of EFTPOS
terminals in recent years (Figure 10), and these and other card-based payment
systems now account for more than half the volume of remote payment
transactions.15 A byproduct of this technology, however, and of banks’ relatively
low transaction charges, has been a greatly increased capacity for bank customers to
make low-value transactions. To an important degree the result has been to
                                                                                                                                  
14 See Edey and Hviding (1995).
15 See Mackrell (1996).25
stimulate demand for additional transactions services rather than significantly
displacing demand for over-the-counter transactions at bank branches.16 Thus, the
general logic for higher transactions charges remains powerful.
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Source: Australian Payments System Council Annual Reports.
Against the background of these developments, banks have also set their eyes
increasingly on the burgeoning superannuation and funds-management sector as a
potential long-term offset to these pressures. Aggregate funds under management
currently total over $300 billion and, on latest estimates, banks already control
around 25 per cent of that total. Growth of banks’ activities in this area has been
rapid over the past five years (Table 4). The question of how banks (narrowly
defined) can effectively insulate themselves (and their depositors) from the activities
of their funds-management subsidiaries will be one of the ongoing issues facing
supervisors and regulators. Another is the extent to which banks should be
permitted to offer, or conceivably could offer,  superannuation products of some
form through their own balance sheets.
                                                                                                                                  
16 Prices Surveillance Authority (1995), p. 179.26
Table 4: Assets of Funds Managers
(a)
 Control by ultimate manager, per cent, as at June
(b)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Life office groups 45 45 44 42 39 39
(c)
Banking groups 21 23 23 25 26 25
Other 34 32 33 33 35 36
Notes: (a) Excludes general insurers.
(b) Some estimation involved.
(c) Includes State Bank of NSW funds-management operations.
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia.
It should be  emphasised that the competitive pressures, and potential responses
analysed in this section are still emerging. Bank profits, on the whole, remain high if
judged by recent results and the real pressures would appear to lie ahead.
3.3 Impact of Foreign Banks
Only two foreign institutions operated continuously as authorised banks in Australia
in the postwar period prior to 1985.17 The absence of a wider foreign banking
presence reflected the moratorium on foreign bank entry, discussed earlier, that had
effectively applied in Australia since the war. Despite these restrictions, foreign
banks did participate in the Australian financial sector via three main channels –
through correspondent banking arrangements with Australian banks, through lending
to Australian borrowers facilitated by the presence of representative offices and,
most importantly, through the activities of foreign-owned or partially owned
merchant banks. The merchant banking sector accounted for about 5 per cent of the
assets held by intermediaries by the late 1970s and much of that related directly to
the activities of foreign-owned institutions.
The emergence of a ‘foreign bank presence’ in Australia in the absence of
‘authorised foreign banks’ represents what, with hindsight, appears to have been a
novel approach to the definition of banks and non-banks within the
Banking Act 1959. Section 11 of the Act, for example, draws a distinction between
those ‘persons’ wishing to ‘carry out banking business’ and those wishing to ‘carry
                                                                                                                                  
17 The Bank of New Zealand and Banque Nationale de Paris. The Bank of China also operated
up to 1972, re-opening in 1985.27
out the general business of banking’. The latter required a formal banking authority
while the former could be exempted from that requirement. Nowhere, however,
were the activities which constituted the ‘general business of banking’, as distinct
from the ‘business of banking’, specified. Those institutions successfully seeking an
exemption under section 11 became part of the non-bank sector. Large numbers of
foreign banks entered the Australian market by this mechanism.18
A more formal opening of access to the domestic banking system was an important
focus of the Campbell Committee. In outlining the case for foreign bank entry, the
Campbell Committee argued that foreign banks would add to the competitiveness of
the system. The Committee also warned that the contribution foreign banks could
make to improved competition should not be exaggerated, given that they were
already present in the market. There was a strong sense however,  that, as banks,
such institutions could provide a more comprehensive array of banking services
(especially in the retail area), could structure themselves in more efficient ways, and
could generally be more competitive than as non-bank entities.
The relaxation of foreign bank entry announced in 1984 saw a limited number of
pre-existing non-bank institutions convert to bank status in response to an invitation
from the government. There was, in addition, an injection of a number of genuinely
new banking entrants and an expansion in the number of foreign banks operating as
merchant banks.19 One feature of the entry requirement was that foreign banks
assumed a subsidiary rather than a branch structure. This was based on a view that
to engage in the full range of banking activities in the Australian market, which
encompassed both wholesale and retail activities, it was desirable from a prudential
perspective to require capital to be held locally. In addition, it was felt that capital
                                                                                                                                  
18 The Financial Corporations Act 1974 provided that all institutions satisfying the definition of
‘money market corporations’ (merchant banks) automatically gained a section 11 exemption
under the Banking Act.
19 The decision to allow an increase in the number of merchant banks operating in the market was
against the background of the decision that only a limited number of new banking authorities
would be issued. In all, 16 applicants for banking authorities were accepted of a much larger
number that applied.28
should also be set at a relatively high absolute level to encourage applicants with
sufficient financial standing.20
The experience of foreign banks from the mid 1980s to the end of the decade, and
their impact on the Australian banking system, proved to be mixed. At one level, the
introduction of new banks, and the perception of the competition they would bring
to the market, brought a new competitive focus to the entire banking system. There
were some concrete examples of that process relatively early on. Some of the
innovations in retail banking in the mid 1980s, for example, such as the payment of
interest on current accounts and improvements to credit card facilities, flowed from
the foreign banking sector and were quickly taken up by Australian banks. On the
wholesale side, foreign banks continued their ‘merchant banking’ activities and in
that sphere were innovative in product development and in financial and derivative
markets. In terms of overall assets, however, the picture was less noteworthy. As a
group, foreign banks quickly established around a 10 per cent share of total banking
system assets, as assets were shifted from the non-bank to the banking sector, and
that proportion was broadly maintained over the remainder of the decade. With only
very minor exceptions, foreign banks were not able to make an impact on the
dominant position of the Australian banks in the retail and commercial market,
where large customer franchises had been established through extensive branch
networks.
A second round of foreign bank entry began in 1992 when a generally more open-
ended policy was adopted. In contrast to the position taken in the mid 1980s,
foreign banks were encouraged to apply for authorisation at any time and in any
number and, provided they met the entry requirements, they were permitted to adopt
either subsidiary or branch structures. Where a branch structure was chosen, the
bank was not permitted to participate in retail finance activities on the grounds that
full local supervision and the depositor protection arrangements of the Banking Act
could not realistically be applied.21 A number of foreign banks strongly challenged
this view but the policy was maintained and remains in force.
                                                                                                                                  
20 A minimum Tier 1 capital requirement was set at $20 million, and subsequently increased to
$50 million.
21 For these purposes, retail activities were defined in terms of retail deposit-taking. In brief,
branches were not permitted to take deposits from customers unless the initial deposit amount29
The number of foreign entrants increased significantly from 1992 (Table 5). Overall,
however, the activities of foreign banks remained relatively small compared to the
long-established Australian banks. Their share of banking system assets rose to 14
per cent by 1996 as a result of new entries but, with only minor exceptions, their
activities remained heavily focused on wholesale or institutional markets.22
Table 5: Authorised Foreign Banks in Australia
1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996
Branches 2 3 3 3 3 8 17
Subsidiaries 0 15 15 15 14 13 13
Total 2 18 18 18 17 21 30
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia.
3.4 Financial Markets
Growth of financial-market activity has been a major feature of financial-sector
development since the 1970s. Important early developments were the freeing of the
CD rate in 1973, subsequent growth of the CD and commercial bill markets, and the
introduction of a bill futures market in 1979.23 Additional impetus came from the
introduction of market tenders for treasury notes (1979) and government bonds
(1982) and the float of the exchange rate and removal of exchange controls in 1983.
New foreign bank entrants after 1985 further stimulated growth and innovation.
Another important factor has been the growth of the funds-management sector and
the associated demand for risk-management and financial-trading services. In a
sense, the increasing liquidity of the main financial markets created a momentum of
its own by making it increasingly possible to compare funds managers’
performances over short periods and thereby stimulating competition among them as
to comparative rates of return. This in turn generated demand for high-frequency
financial trading and for new instruments of risk management. Financial-market
                                                                                                                                  
was $250,000 or more. Any deposits taken within foreign bank branches were not extended
the benefits of the depositor protection provisions of the Banking Act.
22 The noteworthy exception was Citibank which established a highly innovative retail operation.
It was very small, nonetheless, relative to most of the established banks.
23 This was the first interest rate contract offered on an exchange outside the United States.30
volatility was itself also a factor in stimulating trading activities and demand for
risk-management products.
Important areas of growth were in the markets for foreign exchange and interest-rate
products, where turnover grew dramatically in the late 1980s. The other area to
expand rapidly was that of financial derivatives, including foreign exchange and
interest rate futures, forwards, swaps and options. In many of these areas, the
Australian market is quite large in international terms. Australia has the ninth largest
foreign exchange market and the sixth largest interest rate futures market in the
world, ahead of a number of countries with much larger economies. The markets
have also become increasingly sophisticated, though the products most heavily
traded have been at the simpler end of the spectrum. Issuance and trading of
corporate bonds remain relatively small, however, underlining the point that the
growth of financial markets has been primarily related to the risk-management
function of these markets, rather than to any shift to securitisation of financial flows
to the business sector. Growth of the main markets is summarised in Table 6.
Much of the development and innovation in these markets occurred within the
banking system. Similarly, trading activity in the new financial markets has been
largely dominated by banks. For example almost 90 per cent of foreign exchange
dealing and around 80 per cent of over-the-counter interest-rate derivatives dealing
fell to these institutions.24 Figure 11 shows the rapid expansion in banks’ derivative
activities, especially over the latter part of the 1980s. Financial market growth has
thus provided an important field for banks to expand their activities during the post-
deregulation period.
                                                                                                                                  
24 For a review, see Reserve Bank of Australia (1996).31




















1980 0.1 — — — — 0.03 — — — — —
1985 0.3 — — 0.3 0.5 0.07 0.07 — 0.8 2.0 0.3
1990 1.2 1.7 2.0 1.7 11.4 0.23 0.19 0.5 7.5 8.6 1.4
1995 6.0 6.0 2.9 1.0 19.0 0.47 0.44 0.8 14.0 7.2 1.0
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin and Occasional Paper No. 8.
Figure 11:  Banks’ Derivatives Activity
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Note: Data from December 1987 to March 1989 are estimated.
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia internal.
Financial market trading is highly competitive and margins on established products
generally thin. This has been increasingly the case in recent years. Good returns can
be obtained if new products or new financial markets can be exploited but growth32
and profitability potential decline as the ‘product cycle’ matures. This phenomenon
is clearly evident in the two largest financial markets (foreign exchange and bill
futures) illustrated in Figure 12, although to some extent the recent slower growth
may be related to more stable trading conditions and a consequent reduction in
demand for risk-management products. A number of major market players have
reduced their financial trading activities or withdrawn from particular segments
where profitability is lowest. Since 1994, many banks have greatly scaled down
their proprietary trading (active position taking).
Figure 12:  Financial Market Turnover
1985 = 100, log scale



















Sources: Reserve Bank of Australia and Sydney Futures Exchange.
This characteristic of the product cycle suggests that future profitability of financial
market activities will depend on continued growth and innovation in these markets.
On that score, prospects for growth are likely to be supported by continuing growth
of the funds-management sector (see Section 4). The scope for continued product
innovation, however, is hard to predict. Equity and commodity-related derivatives
are gaining in interest amongst the more specialist market players and the more
sophisticated institutions have begun to investigate the potential offered by the
development of other new markets, such as the emerging market for electricity in a33
number of Australian states. There is also a very tentative examination of the scope
for developing credit derivatives by some institutions, an innovation that is still in
embryonic form even in the United States. Many institutions are looking also at the
use of derivatives to differentiate and add value to their balance-sheet products via
the use of swaps and options, a potential growth area for derivative activities. The
question remains, however, as to whether the next generation of developments
within the financial markets will offer anything like the same potential for growth in
revenues as occurred in the 1980s.
3.5 Profits, Productivity and Efficiency
Although banking was highly regulated prior to the 1980s, with controls over most
lending rates and various controls over the composition of bank asset portfolios,
entry was also tightly restricted. While the former influence acted to limit
profitability of the banking sector, the latter would have tended to enhance it.
Available data suggests that profitability of banking in Australia, in fact, grew
steadily over the 1960s and 1970s, probably reaching a peak by the early 1980s
(Figure 13). At that point, profitability in banking appeared to be well above the
average of other Australian industrial sectors (Table 7).
The structural shifts to the financial system that followed deregulation saw some of
the assumptions underlying banking in Australia begin to break down. Profitability
stabilised, albeit at a relatively high level, in the first half of the 1980s as the
combination of increased freedoms within the system interacted with greater
potential for price competitiveness and, around the middle of the decade, increased
competition from new entrants to the market. Over this period, Australian banks
sought to expand their operations both domestically and internationally in the search
for new sources of revenue and comparative advantage. For some banks, this
process has continued to the present time. For others, the process of overseas
expansion was halted and reversed in the early 1990s (see below). There were
tentative signs by the middle years of the 1980s, however, that profitability in
banking may have begun to ease a little from the high points of earlier years.34
Figure 13:  Major Banks’ Profitability
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Source: Banks’ financial statements.
Table 7: Earnings
Per cent of shareholders’ funds
1980-1982 1990-1992 1994 1995
Banks and finance 14.6 3.5 14.4 16.0
All companies 10.8 4.9 7.2 8.0
Source: Australian Stock Exchange Financial and Profitability Study.
Further interpretation of the effects on profitability of the structural changes in the
financial sector was complicated greatly in the late 1980s and early 1990s by the
effects of the first post-deregulation cycle in the banking sector (and the most
significant cycle in the banking system since the 1930s). Profitability in the banking
system fell sharply with the collapse of the asset boom which had fuelled much of
the speculative lending activity of the late 1980s, and the recession of 1990/91.
While the timing of losses varied, all the main groups of banks – major, state and
others – registered overall losses at some point between 1990 and 1992. Foreign
banks as a group were the hardest hit with losses amounting to 30 per cent of their35
capital in 1990 alone. Between 1986 and 1990, aggregate foreign bank losses
absorbed an amount equal to their original start-up capital. State banks lost heavily
over the period (with concentrated effects in Victoria and South Australia) and some
major banks suffered large losses in the early 1990s. Similar episodes of losses, in
some cases more severe, were experienced in the non-bank sector (particularly
amongst merchant banks) as well as in the banking systems of other countries over a
comparable period.25
The response to the downturn in profits around the turn of the decade was a process
of rationalisation which continues today. Costs, which had risen over the 1980s,
became a new focus as did the viability of many of the overseas operations which
had expanded in the previous decade. Domestically, the major banks especially
sought to reduce the number of branches and to reduce staff levels, which had
expanded rapidly between 1985 and 1989. These factors, together with improved
economic conditions, and the eventual rundown in stocks of problem loans, saw
profit levels in banking rise again to levels previously seen in the early to mid
1980s. Nonetheless a question mark remains concerning the extent to which banks
will be able to maintain these levels of profitability as competitive forces become
more pronounced in the period ahead. The widespread presumption, and one of the
key themes of this paper, is that underlying banking profitability is on the wane, and
it is this factor which has driven much of the debate on where the banking and
financial system is headed in the longer term.
A more general question, and one that has been the subject of considerable debate,
concerns the nature and extent of net public benefits from financial deregulation.
The broad outlines of this debate are well known.26 Financial deregulation was
expected to bring a variety of efficiency gains, and a convincing argument can be
made that many of these have been delivered – for example, increased diversity of
choice for buyers of financial services, increased product innovation including a
wide range of new retail banking services, higher returns to depositors and removal
of non-price credit rationing induced by regulatory constraints. Moreover, as alluded
                                                                                                                                  
25 Similar experiences occurred in a range of different countries over a comparable period (the
United States, Japan, parts of Europe and Scandinavia). This suggests that the processes which
led to the cycle in the banking sector in Australia were not unique and may have been derived
from basically similar underlying causes (Macfarlane 1989; Borio 1990; and BIS 1993).
26 See Perkins (1989), Harper (1991), Phelps (1991) and Edey and Hviding (1995).36
to above, there are good reasons for thinking that reductions in lending margins are
likely in the years ahead. The costs usually cited as coming from deregulation are
those associated with the financial cycle that followed the deregulation period – the
lowering of credit standards, excessive credit expansion and the resultant loan-
losses and balance-sheet contraction that contributed to the severity of the early
1990s recession. Whether these transitional costs could have been avoided by
alternative approaches to  macroeconomic management or to financial regulatory
policy is another question.27 As far as regulatory policy is concerned, it is not clear
that some sort of transition to a deregulated system could have been avoided, given
the shrinkage of the regulatory base that was occurring under the old system. Of
course, none of this debate is unique to Australia.
One reason that this debate has tended to be inconclusive is that there is no agreed
method of measuring the financial sector’s output and efficiency. Essentially two
types of approaches are available – what might be termed the output and the income
approaches.28 Output-based approaches attempt to measure the production of
services directly using indicators of the volume of services performed, such as
transactions processed or assets under management. These measures are subject to
the criticism that they do not necessarily capture the real value of output to the
consumer – the argument that deregulation has induced greater financial turnover
but that it is not particularly productive.29 Income-based approaches aim to solve
this problem by defining output as the real net revenue that financial intermediaries
earn.30 The problem with this is that it fails to distinguish price and volume
movements – deregulation can be expected to have reduced the cost but raised the
volume and quality of financial services supplied, and revenue measures do not
separate these components.
For what they are worth, simple output indicators such as the one depicted in Figure
14, based on total assets, suggest that major increases in financial-sector
                                                                                                                                  
27 Concerning issues of  macroeconomic management, and specifically monetary policy, see
Macfarlane (1991).
28 For further discussion of these conceptual issues, see  Colwell and Davis (1992). A third
approach, where output is measured by the volume of inputs, essentially assumes zero
productivity growth.
29 See Stiglitz (1993).
30 This is essentially the approach taken in the national accounts.37
productivity have occurred since the early 1980s. Here it is noteworthy that, after an
initial period of growth in the mid 1980s, financial-sector employment has
contracted considerably, notwithstanding the continuing growth in financial activity.
Moreover, in one important sense, that growth is understated by asset measures
because off-balance sheet services have grown even faster. Other direct measures of
productivity such as transactions processed per employee, ATM and EFTPOS
facilities and the like, would similarly show major increases.
Figure 14: Financial Sector
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Index Index
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics Cat. No. 6203.0 and Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin.
4. Funds Management
A basic distinction in principle can be made between intermediaries, which offer
deposit and loan services on a capital-guaranteed basis, and funds managers, which
manage but do not bear investment risk on behalf of their account holders. This
distinction is reflected in the differing balance-sheet structures of the two types of
institutions. Financial intermediaries require capital in order to shield depositors
from investment risks whereas funds managers have a structure in which investment38
risk is borne by the members; in effect, members’ funds are a form of equity. To a
large extent the two sets of institutions have developed separately in Australia, and
their structure and growth need to be explained in terms of rather different forces. It
was also argued earlier that households have tended to view deposits and funds
under management as quite distinct products and not closely substitutable; at any
rate, the broad historical experience seems consistent with that interpretation.
Nonetheless, a number of areas of growing competitive interaction between
intermediaries and funds managers can be identified, including the increasing
involvement by banks in funds-management activities already discussed in Section
3. The discussion that follows focuses mainly on the life insurance and
superannuation sector, which comprises the bulk of the funds-management sector.31
We first look at the historical sources of growth of these institutions and then move
on to consider the issue of competition between funds managers and intermediaries.
4.1 Life Insurance and Superannuation: Sources of Growth
Historically the life insurance and superannuation sector has represented around 20
to 25 per cent of the total assets of the Australian financial system. It is currently a
little above that range, having grown rapidly in recent years. The structure of the
industry has been influenced by a number of major policy developments during the
past 10-15 years. Three were particularly important.
The first was a shift in the tax treatment of  superannuation. Prior to 1983
superannuation was taxed at extremely low effective rates, with contributions fully
deductible, earnings untaxed, and only a small tax on final benefits. Subsequent tax
changes (the most important of which were made in 1983 and 1988) reduced this
concessional treatment substantially by introducing or raising taxes at all three of
these levels; the treatment remains concessional relative to other financial savings,
but much less so than previously.32 Ironically these changes, by reducing inequities
and fiscal revenue costs, laid the foundation for subsequent expansion by making
                                                                                                                                  
31 Cash management trusts and other unit trusts are also usually classified as funds managers,
although in some respects (particularly in the case of cash management trusts) their activities
resemble those of deposit-takers. Some aspects of these institutions are discussed in Sections 2
and 3.
32 Fuller discussions of these tax issues are provided by  Edey and Simon (1996) and
Fitzgerald (1996).39
private superannuation a more suitable vehicle for mandatory saving. However, the
successive layers of tax changes have enormously increased the complexity of
superannuation and appear to have contributed to rising administrative costs for
superannuation funds.
The second main policy development was the introduction of award superannuation
beginning in 1986, when the Industrial Relations Commission endorsed a claim for a
general employer-provided  superannuation benefit, set initially at 3 per cent of
income. This benefit was gradually incorporated into employment awards as they
came up for renegotiation over the next several years. Payments were directed either
into existing funds or into union-created industry funds which in other respects were
the same as those already in existence (that is, managed by private funds-
management firms); these funds now represent the fastest-growing part of the
superannuation industry, although their asset base remains small. A consequence of
this history is that many of the structural features of superannuation coverage for the
newly-covered employees (for example, the choice of fund, and the nature of
benefits provided) are written into awards which continue to govern those basic
conditions under the newer government-mandated scheme.
The third main development was the introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee
Charge in 1991. This gave the mandatory system its current basic shape by
legislating a timetable for further increases in contributions and setting tax penalties
for non-compliance. The target level of employer contributions, to be phased in over
a number of years, was set at 9 per cent. Further policies announced in 1995
specified a timetable for supplementary contributions by employees of 3 per cent,
with a matching contribution from the federal government, to bring the total
contributions rate to 15 per cent by 2002. These broad parameters now have
bipartisan political endorsement, although the new government has indicated that the
delivery method for the employee and government contributions could still be
varied.
The higher contributions rates resulting from these policies can clearly be expected
to have a major impact on the industry, and indeed on the financial system as a40
whole, in future decades.33 Already the proportion of employees covered has
increased dramatically from around one-third of private-sector employees in the
early 1980s to around 90 per cent at present. But this increase has yet to have a
significant impact on the sector’s overall asset growth, which is largely explained by
other factors outlined below.
Trends in the  superannuation sector’s overall size and its sources of funds are
summarised in Figures 15 and 16.34 Broadly, the historical growth of the
Figure 15:  Assets of Life Offices and Superannuation Funds












94/95 89/90 84/85 79/80 74/75 69/70 64/65 59/60
Sources: Reserve Bank of Australia Occasional Paper No. 8. and Australian Bureau of Statistics Cat. No. 5232.0.
                                                                                                                                  
33 Projections by Knox (1995) suggest that the superannuation sector could roughly double as a
ratio to GDP, from its current level of 40 per cent, over the next 25 years, eventually reaching
something like four times GDP when the system reaches its peak asset holdings.
34 For statistical purposes this discussion treats life insurance and  superannuation funds as a
single aggregate because their activities are similar and much of the historical data does not
distinguish between the two.41
Figure 16:  Net Contributions and Growth in Superannuation Assets
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Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics Cat. Nos 5204.0 and 5232.0 and Reserve Bank of Australia Occasional
Paper No. 8.
superannuation sector can be divided into three phases. The first phase, which
ended in the early 1970s, was one of moderate and fairly steady growth. In the
second phase, which comprised most of the 1970s, superannuation assets shrank
relative to nominal GDP, largely reflecting poor earnings performance and high
inflation. The third phase, from the early 1980s onward, has been one of rapid
expansion in which total assets more than doubled as a ratio to GDP, although this
may have slowed down in the latest few years. The data presented in Figure 16
divide the sources of superannuation asset growth between net new contributions
and a residual representing earnings on existing assets and capital gains. Although
net contributions have fluctuated significantly in some periods, it is apparent that
most of the variation in overall growth performance is attributable to variation in the
earnings and capital gain component, rather than in contributions.35 The three
                                                                                                                                  
35 Capital gains are likely, however, to be understated in the 1960s and 1970s, and overstated in
the early 1980s, as a consequence of the widespread use of historical-cost valuations prior to
the 1980s.42
growth phases outlined above correspond broadly to periods of moderate, negative,
and high real rates of return on financial assets, as summarised in Table 8.
Table 8: Superannuation Fund Earnings Rates




Early 1990s 6.8 3.0
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics Cat. Nos 5204.0 and 6401.0. Earnings defined as the difference
between change in assets and net contributions.
On the basis of currently available data, aggregate net contributions to
superannuation funds do not yet show the upward trend expected to result from the
compulsory plan.36 A number of possible reasons can be given for this. First, there
is likely to be a strong cyclical influence on net contributions. They fell
substantially in the recession of the early 1980s, when withdrawals related to early
retirements are likely to have been particularly important. This may again have been
a factor in the early 1990s. In addition, many voluntary schemes contain a tranche of
employee-contributed funds which do not have to be preserved to retirement but can
be withdrawn on leaving a job.37 There is also provision to allow early withdrawal
of funds in cases of hardship. For all these reasons, recessions can be expected to
result in significantly increased withdrawals from superannuation funds as jobs are
lost. Secondly, many employers were already satisfying, at least partly, the
requirements of the compulsory plan under pre-existing voluntary arrangements.
This has allowed some scope for absorption of the compulsory scheme into existing
arrangements, and has meant that the aggregate effect of the new compulsory
schedule has so far been relatively small; but it can be expected to increase as the
mandatory contributions rate increases significantly above levels currently
prevailing. Thirdly, an important factor in the second half of the 1980s was the
phenomenon of  overfunding of existing defined-benefit schemes. High rates of
                                                                                                                                  
36 These data should be interpreted cautiously, however, as they have in the past been subject to
substantial revision.
37 Recent regulatory changes restrict this right of withdrawal, subject to  grandfathering of
existing withdrawable amounts.43
return meant that surpluses were accumulated in many of these schemes, enabling
the employers who sponsored them either to withdraw funds, or to finance their
superannuation liabilities with reduced contributions. Finally, it is possible that
increased tax rates on  superannuation savings after 1983 have discouraged
voluntary contributions.38
To summarise these trends, it is apparent that most of the variation in the growth of
superannuation funds’ assets in recent decades is attributable to changes in the
funds’ earnings rates, combined with the fact that the long-term nature of
superannuation accounts tends to mean that earnings are locked in and automatically
reinvested. Although a sustained lift in net superannuation contributions is projected
for the future under current policies, there is little evidence of that so far in the
available data. This observation is relevant to debate as to the potential for
compulsory superannuation to divert household funds that would otherwise have
gone to financial intermediaries.39 On the basis of the trends outlined above, claims
that this has already occurred to a significant degree would not be substantiated.
Nonetheless, competition for new savings between banks and superannuation funds
is likely to be an important issue in the future. Most projections of the impact of
compulsory  superannuation assume a degree of crowding out of other forms of
saving,40 implying a reduced flow of household funds into other savings vehicles as
compulsory superannuation flows increase. To the extent that this occurs, however,
it may affect households’ direct asset holdings more than deposits with
intermediaries, since the former are more likely to be regarded as closely
substitutable with superannuation accounts.
                                                                                                                                  
38 There is also a serious longer-term policy concern: the potential for funds to leak from the
compulsory scheme due to incentives  favouring early retirement and dissipation of
accumulated savings. See Edey and Simon (1996) and FitzGerald (1996).
39 This issue was discussed by the Martin Committee report (1991).
40 Official projections are discussed in Saving for Our Future (1995). These assume that one-third
of the projected increase in superannuation contributions is offset by reductions in other forms
of saving. Similar non-official estimates are also available. See Covick and Higgs (1995) and
Corcoran and Richardson (1995).44
4.2 Competition with Intermediaries
Related to this issue is the more general question as to whether the structure of
financial institutions is changing in a way that brings funds managers and
intermediaries more directly into competition, through overlap in their functions or
increasing similarity of product lines. One aspect of this, already discussed in
Section 3, is the involvement of banks in funds-management business through
subsidiaries. In principle however, the existing regulatory and prudential guidelines
keep these businesses separated. For example, banks are not permitted to offer
funds-management products on their own balance sheets or to apply their capital
directly to funds-management operations.
Putting that aspect aside, a good general case can be made that the two sets of
institutions have operated in fairly distinct markets. On the assets side of the
respective balance sheets, the banks’ core business of direct lending can be
contrasted with the life and  superannuation sector’s main investments in debt
securities, equities and property. However, one area of overlap historically was that
life offices were significant mortgage lenders for a period of time up until around the
early 1970s. Their involvement in mortgage business reflected a number of
conditions prevailing at the time, including the banks’ inability to meet fully the
underlying demand, and the relatively early stage of development of alternative
mortgage lenders. The life offices were also able to link their loans with the
provision of whole-of-life policies which benefited from generous tax treatment.
Life-office mortgages were generally on fixed-interest terms, which meant that their
profitability declined substantially as the general level of interest rates rose in the
1960s and 1970s. Total direct lending by life offices has declined steadily in relation
to their balance sheet, dropping from around 40 per cent of assets in the late 1950s
to around 7 per cent at present. Similarly, superannuation funds (to date at least)
have only a small involvement in direct lending (Table 9).41 The growth areas for
investment by life and superannuation funds have for a number of years been in
equities and foreign assets. More recently, however, some life offices have again
become more active in the home-mortgage market, seeking to take advantage of the
same kinds of competitive opportunities as the mortgage managers.
                                                                                                                                  
41 The 7 per cent balance-sheet share shown in Table 9 is likely to be overstated, as it includes
loans to public authorities by public-sector superannuation funds.45
Table 9: Assets of Superannuation Funds
December 1995
$ billion Per cent
Cash and short-term bank instruments 40.4 14.5
Loans 20.7 7.4






Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics Cat. No. 5232.0.
In terms of liabilities, the basic differences in financial structures of intermediaries
and funds managers have already been noted. Superannuation fund liabilities are the
long-term savings of their members, whereas bank liabilities are a combination of
transaction balances, short-term savings and marketable-debt instruments. The
banking system in Australia has not traditionally been an important vehicle for
longer-term saving,42 so the competition with the long-term savings institutions for
household-sector funds has not been particularly strong. This short-term/long-term
distinction reinforces the conceptual distinction between capital-guaranteed deposits
with intermediaries, and funds-under-management which are subject to investment
risk. On the basis of these two sets of distinctions, intermediaries and funds
managers have historically been competing for household funds in quite different
areas of the market.
In a number of respects, this neat division is becoming less clear cut. Specialist
funds-management institutions, such as unit trusts, are able to offer a range of short-
term investment services, some of which closely resemble deposits, and these
institutions have grown substantially in recent years. Increasingly banks are offering
the same services, but not on the balance sheet of the bank itself. Also important is
that the superannuation sector has become a major holder of essentially mobile or
short-term savings of retirees. This trend has been boosted by increasing rates of
early retirement, the wide availability of lump-sum retirement benefits and the
                                                                                                                                  
42 This view is documented by Edey, Foster and Macfarlane (1991).46
advent of rollover funds, which retain the status of tax-favoured  superannuation
vehicles but offer some of the characteristics of shorter-term savings.43 This has
provided a category of relatively high-wealth individuals with a highly attractive
alternative to financial intermediaries for holding what are fairly liquid balances.
Another important consequence of these developments is that the funds-
management sector has itself become an important provider of funds to financial
intermediaries. For example around $40 billion, or 15 per cent of superannuation
assets are currently held as bank securities or deposits with financial institutions, a
significant proportion of these institutions’ liability base. Growth of these
‘wholesale’ sources of funds to the banks represents a potential source of upward
pressure on their average cost of funds.
The banks clearly believe there are advantages to be gained from combining their
intermediation role with funds-management activities, and have pushed for
allowance of more direct involvement in retirement-saving products, as well as
having introduced a range of over-the-counter investment products in recent years.
These developments, and the changing nature of the funds-management sector itself,
point to increasing areas of overlap between the products offered by banks and
funds managers. Although the legal distinction between capital-guaranteed and other
products is preserved, the system seems to be moving towards a spectrum of more
closely substitutable products in place of the clear traditional dividing line between
deposits and funds-management services.
5. Conclusions
A feature of the historical experience reviewed in this paper has been a widening of
competition between banks and other suppliers of financial services. Developments
in financial regulation have been an important, and familiar, part of the story.
Regulatory constraints contributed to the loss of the banks’ initial dominance of
financial intermediation, and the removal of those constraints stimulated some of the
important subsequent trends – a recovery in banks’ market share, a general
expansion in the volume and range of financial activity and stronger competition
from new entrants. But to a significant degree, regulatory policies were responding
                                                                                                                                  
43 Following rule changes in 1992, rollover-fund operations can now be carried out within
ordinary superannuation funds.47
to pressures for change rather than being an initiating force, and they were arguably
more important in shaping the speed and timing of structural changes than their
underlying direction.
The deeper underlying forces for change have been developments in technology,
which transformed supply conditions in the industry, and their interaction with the
cost and pricing structures of traditional  intermediation. The net effect can be
viewed as a general shift in the nature of the ‘production technology’ of financial
services. Traditional banking involves a joint-production technology that produces
deposit, lending and transactions services within a given institution. This structure
has faced an increasing challenge from separate-production technologies: that is,
from specialist enterprises that efficiently produce a single line of financial service,
such as cash management accounts, payment services or  securitised mortgages.
Similarly, financial market trading can be seen as a specialist product that does not
need to be part of a full-service banking operation.
This separation of basic product lines has had important consequences for the
competitive position of the major banks. Already single-service providers have been
able to compete vigorously with banks in key lines of business and, although banks
retain a large share of deposit and loan markets, this competition has clearly begun
to affect their interest margins. Competition has also put pressure on banks to
reduce the cross-subsidisation of payments services, in turn contributing to the
general trend towards separate pricing and production of individual services. The
separation of product lines also affects the nature of the core business of banking. In
contrast to the traditional structure, where the core business was readily identifiable
as the joint production of deposit, loan and transactions services, there can
increasingly be seen to be several separate core products, not all of which need to
appear together in any one institution. In this sense, the special position of banks, at
least within the financial intermediation sector, is becoming less easy to define.
It is important not to exaggerate the extent to which these trends have already
progressed. The major banks continue to run large traditional deposit and lending
businesses which still account for the bulk of their profits and for most of the assets
of the financial  intermediation sector.  Securitisation is much less advanced in
Australia than in several countries with otherwise comparable financial systems.
Nonetheless, there has been a growing functional overlap between different
providers of financial services, which can be seen as taking place on three levels.48
The first level, and the one that is furthest advanced, involves competition between
banks and other intermediaries. Although banks dominate the intermediation sector
in terms of balance-sheet size, there is strong competition with other intermediaries
and a high degree of overlap between the activities of the main groups of institutions
– banks, building societies, finance companies and merchant banks. This has been
amply testified by the ease with which business could move back and forth between
these groups of institutions over the past few decades, reflecting the shifting
advantages conferred by changes in regulatory policy.
The second level of the evolving competitive scene involves competition between
intermediaries and funds managers. This is much less advanced than competition
within the intermediaries sector but, in a number of respects, the traditional
functional separation between intermediaries and funds managers has been breaking
down. One aspect of this has been the growth of banks’ own funds-management
operations (although these remain separated from banks’ on-balance sheet
activities). At the same time there has been an increasing involvement of funds-
management institutions in  intermediation activities like mortgage lending. Also
important has been the provision of short-term investment facilities by both banks
and funds managers, which bring funds-management products more directly into
competition with bank depository services.
Finally, there is a third level of potential development involving competition
between financial and non-financial businesses. This has not occurred to any
significant degree in Australia although there are a number of examples in overseas
markets of non-financial businesses entering the market as financial service
suppliers.44
All this raises the question of where are the remaining natural boundaries (if any)
between the different suppliers of financial services. An important lesson from
earlier regulatory policy experience was that regulations tended to break down
where they placed artificial constraints on competition between institutions
performing essentially similar functions. The analysis presented in this paper
suggests that there has been a tendency for functional overlaps between institutions
to increase but that, in a number of important areas (the second and third levels
outlined above) this process has not yet gone very far. How far the process
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continues in the foreseeable future will depend importantly on the regulatory policy
response, and particularly on whether policies are aimed at removing remaining
institutional distinctions or reinforcing them.50
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